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WHY I TEACH WATER LAW 
Joseph L. Sax* 
I began my first law school job in 1962 and water law is the 
only subject I have taught every year since then. Though I am 
enthusiastic about all the courses I teach, I confess that water 
law remains my favorite. I have often asked myself why, because 
few subjects are considered more peripheral to the central mis-
sion of the law schools. In the East and Midwest the course is 
rarely taught, and in the West-where it has long been a sta-
ple-it is pretty much treated as a "nuts-and-bolts" offering for 
students who will practice in appropriation doctrine states. 
I offer four reasons for teaching, and studying, water law. 
I. WATER LAW INCORPORATES A DISTINCTIVE REGIME OF 
PROPERTY LAW, QUITE DIFFERENT IN CONCEPT FROM ANY OF THE 
PROPERTY LAW TO WHICH WE ARE ACCUSTOMED 
The central question of water law is why, and how, water is 
different. In one respect, water is ordinary property. One can ob-
tain a vested right in it, buy and sell it, lease and transfer it, use 
and profit from it. At the same time, it is very different from 
everything else we commonly think of as private property. If I 
own a wristwatch, a bag of potatoes, or a house, I can use them 
or leave them unused. I can crush my watch under my heel, or 
live alone in a ten bedroom mansion while others yearn for a 
place to sleep. 
Water is different. I can own it, but not without using it. If I 
don't put it to a beneficial use (and the law defines beneficial-
ity), I lose my right and the water returns to the public. I am not 
allowed to waste it. I cannot sell it to the detriment of others 
who have relied upon my uses, but must protect them in any 
transfer. I cannot speculate in the water, holding it out of pro-
duction with the hope that the price will rise. I cannot obtain 
private rights in it that intrude on public claims for public uses, 
navigation, fishing, recreational boating, and ecosystem protec-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., 1957, Harvard University; J.D., 
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tion. I usually cannot even build over my own land, if it is sub-
merged by navigable waters. 
Why is water different? Is it because water has some physi-
cally unique quality that makes it unsuitable for ordinary pri-
vate ownership? Or has some special social value been attached 
to water-some publicness-that induces us to view it as differ-
ent? And is that special public quality unique to water, or is 
water law at the cutting edge of a new view of private/public 
relations that will come more and more to the forefront of Amer-
ican law? 
Surely there are some distinctive things about water. It is, 
more than anything else that we treat as private property, a 
shared resource. It is used and reused. A gallon of water flowing 
down the Colorado River will serve a kyacker in Colorado, sus-
tain a National Wildlife Refuge, irrigate crops for a farmer in 
Arizona, produce energy for a Las Vegas casino, and then either 
grow lettuce in the Imperial Valley, wash cars in Los Angeles, or 
flow down to Mexico in fulfillment of national treaty obligations. 
No wristwatch has quite this sort of potential. 
At the same time, water could be treated more like ordinary 
property. We did not have to decide (as one famous old case 
did) that use of water to maintain a scenic waterfall at a resort 
was a non-beneficial, and thus unacceptable, use, simply because 
the water was needed for hydropower production. We don't have 
to make users in the San Francisco Bay Area reclaim and re-use 
their water as a precondition to taking new water, on the theory, 
as one recent case suggests, that there cannot be a right to waste 
water. We don't have to prohibit speculation, and we don't have 
to let rafters float by and over private land just because the 
water is "navigable." 
II. WATER LAW Is INTIMATELY RELATED TO WESTERN HISTORY, 
AND DEEPENS ONE'S UNDERSTANDING OF IT 
The appropriation doctrine evolved in the West. It is a great 
example of the law of necessity becoming the law of the land, 
and the old water law classics, such as Yunker v. Nichols 1 and 
Coffin v. The Left Hand Ditch Co.,2 are splendid models of the 
judiciary thinking through and explaining why a wholly new le-
gal regime needed to be invented and applied. At the same time, 
1. 1 Colo. 551 (1872). 
2. 6 Colo. 443 (1882). 
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students must understand how the federal government, begin-
ning with the first mining law in 1866, determined to let the 
West develop, and how state and federal law came together to 
encourage settlement, mining, and agriculture. The Reclamation 
Law of 1902 shows federal subsidy policy in one of its most dra-
matic forms, and its original residency and acreage limitations 
illustrate the difficulty of creating and maintaining a society of 
small, independent proprietors. The great, early navigation cases 
offer a view into the development of the lumber industry in the 
upper Great Lakes Basin. The navigation servitude provides a 
case study in the evolution of judicial thinking about those 
things "incapable" of private ownership. The tension between 
appropriation and riparian doctrine in California is a case study 
in the efforts of the early land barons to preempt vast riverine 
ranches. The pueblo rights doctrine offers a rare glimpse into 
the mores and values of the Spanish settlement of the South-
west. And there is more, much more. 
III. WATER LAw Is A HIGHLY TECHNICAL FIELD, FuLL OF 
DOCTRINE 
This may not seem an obvious way to lavish praise on a 
course, but I have discovered that law students love to learn 
doctrine, the more abstruse the better. In part, this is just the 
fun of the game. (How many of your friends know what the 
"thalweg" of the Mississippi River is? 3) But there is more to stu-
dents' enjoyment of doctrine than a game. The doctrines provide 
a useful point of entry for attending to important issues and 
putting · them in a context that promotes fruitful discussion. 
When we ask who owns, and who can sell, the water in the Great 
Lakes, we pose profound questions about the limits of private 
ownership, and the meaning of the public trust. The abandon-
ment and forfeiture doctrines help students understand the dis-
tinctive posture of western water law in opposition to specula-
tion, an aspect of American anti-monopoly policy that otherwise 
gets little attention in the law schools. There are dozens of such 
examples. 
3. Unless they have studied German. 
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IV. WATER LAW AND POLICY HAVE CONSEQUENCES THAT 
DESERVE FAR MORE ATTENTION THAN THEY USUALLY GET 
If the oil shale in western Colorado becomes marketable, that 
area will demand (at last) its full share of the waters allocated to 
it out of the Colorado River. But if Colorado takes more of its 
share, the adverse impact will be enormous on the Central Ari-
zona Project, which is now being built to take Colorado River 
water to Phoenix and its environs at a cost of many billions of 
dollars. Indeed, the Central Arizona Project itself, when com-
pleted, will require reductions in use by Californians in the Los 
Angeles area, ·who now carry that water in an aqueduct all the 
way from the Colorado River to southern California. Los Angeles 
could solve its problems if it could get irrigators in the Imperial 
Valley (in southernmost California) to waste less water, and sell 
the savings to it. If that can be done, it will reduce the pressure 
to dam up wilderness rivers in northern California, which is the 
traditional source of supply. The fate of northern California's 
rivers determines the fate of the Central Valley, the nation's 
most productive agricultural growing region and source of fresh 
produce for much of the nation. And what happens in the Cen-
tral Valley affects the quality of water in San Francisco Bay. 
This is just one example of how water law illuminates the links 
between energy policy in the mountains of Colorado, lawn water-
ing in Los Angeles, and the price of fruit in a New York 
supermarket. 
Water is different. Water is interesting. Water law is as good a 
course as the law school curriculum has to offer. 
